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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
Nos. 14-2649, 14-2761
___________
JANE E. ADKINS,
Appellant in 14-2649
v.
JOHN B. SOGLIUZZO, Esq.; DEUTSCHE BANK;
ALEX BROWN; H. THOMPSON RODMAN; L. GAYE TORRANCE;
TD BANK, N.A.; HAVEN SAVINGS BANK
JOHN B. SOGLIUZZO,
Appellant in 14-2761
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-09-cv-01123)
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 26, 2015
______________
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: August 10, 2015)
______________

OPINION
______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from a diversity action in which Jane Adkins,
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee (“Adkins”), sued her brother John Sogliuzzo,
Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant (“Sogliuzzo”), his wife Gaye Torrance
(“Torrance”), and several banks, including Haven Savings Bank (“Haven”), based upon
Sogliuzzo’s allegedly unlawful mismanagement of the finances of their mother Jane
Sogliuzzo and Mary Grimley (“Grimley”), their mother’s first cousin. Adkins brought
dozens of claims against Defendants including breach of fiduciary duty, malicious
representation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, fraudulent
concealment, fraud, and conspiracy.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Haven, concluding that no
special relationship existed between Haven and Adkins, based upon her status as a
beneficiary of Grimley. 1 The District Court also granted partial summary judgment to
Sogliuzzo on the claim of undue influence over Jane Sogliuzzo on res judicata grounds,
based upon the outcome of a prior state court action concerning the same issues.
Following a five-day bench trial, the District Court issued Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, in which it found that: (1) Torrance was not liable in this matter; (2)


This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
1
Adkins was named as a beneficiary of Grimley’s estate in Grimley’s will.
2

Sogliuzzo was liable for undue influence over Jane Sogliuzzo; however, because Adkins
did not demonstrate grounds for damages beyond the judgment already made against
Sogliuzzo in a state court proceeding, no further damages would be awarded; (3) Adkins
failed to establish that her health issues were proximately caused by Sogliuzzo’s actions,
thus her intentional infliction of emotional distress claims failed; (4) Sogliuzzo was liable
for undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, fraud and misrepresentation
with respect to Grimley and the Grimley estate, but the District Court deferred to the
probate court’s determinations regarding the calculation of damages; however, the
District Court did not make clear the basis for this deferral; and (5) Adkins failed to
establish conspiracy, conversion, waste of inheritance, or punitive damages.
On appeal, Adkins argues that the District Court (1) erred in not awarding
damages, despite finding Sogliuzzo liable; (2) made factual errors and failed to address
all claims related to Torrance; (3) erred regarding several evidentiary rulings, including
excluding Torrance’s deposition testimony and barring the testimony of both Adkins’s
accounting expert and of Charles Adkins, Adkins’s husband, regarding his review of
financial documents; and (4) erred in granting summary judgment to Haven.
On cross-appeal, Sogliuzzo argues that the District Court erred by (1) drawing an
adverse inference against him for invoking his Fifth Amendment right not to testify;
(2) not entering a judgment of “no cause” against him when the Court found that
Adkins’s proof was insufficient to award damages; (3) not dismissing Adkins’s claims
3

under a theory of “unclean hands”; and (4) not granting partial summary judgment to him
on res judicata grounds based upon prior state court decisions.
For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment in part,
and reverse and remand in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Adkins and Sogliuzzo are both beneficiaries of the estates of Jane Sogliuzzo and
Grimley. Grimley died in 2006 at 91 years old, and Jane Sogliuzzo died in 2008 at 93
years old. Sogliuzzo was the executor of both Jane Sogliuzzo’s and Grimley’s estates.
Prior to their deaths, Sogliuzzo, an attorney, managed banking and finances for both
Grimley and Jane Sogliuzzo, and held a power of attorney for Grimley’s accounts at
Haven.
In 2002, Adkins, her husband Charles Adkins, Sogliuzzo, and his wife, Torrance,
all assisted Grimley when she moved out of her home; during this process, they
recovered approximately $70,000 in cash from various parts of the home. Sogliuzzo and
Adkins informed Grimley that this cash had been found, and Sogliuzzo said he would
deposit it into Grimley’s Haven account. From 2004 to 2006, $321,040.05 in bonds were
redeemed from Grimley’s accounts at Haven Bank. Adkins alleges that some of these
funds were deposited into accounts shared by Sogliuzzo and his wife, Torrance. Checks
drawn on Grimley’s account made out to Torrance were also deposited into Sogliuzzo
and Torrance’s joint account.
4

Following Grimley’s death in 2006, Adkins received disbursements that she
believed were significantly less than she should have received. Following Jane
Sogliuzzo’s death in 2008, Sogliuzzo informed Adkins that Jane Sogliuzzo had about
$14,000 in assets in addition to her home, and that her investment accounts would be paid
out to Sogliuzzo. Adkins expressed her concerns to Sogliuzzo that there were
irregularities in the accounts and estate of Jane Sogliuzzo. During the summer of 2008,
Sogliuzzo gave up his position as executor of both estates, and Adkins was appointed
executor of the estates.
In September 2008, Adkins, acting as executor of Jane Sogliuzzo’s estate, sued
Sogliuzzo in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Probate Part, Hudson
County, alleging that Sogliuzzo had exerted undue influence over Jane Sogliuzzo. The
state court struck Sogliuzzo’s answer based on unresponsiveness after he invoked his
Fifth Amendment right not to testify. Following proof hearings, the state court found that
Sogliuzzo had exerted undue influence over Jane Sogliuzzo and entered judgment for
$520,414 against Sogliuzzo and in favor of the Estate of Jane Sogliuzzo. The state court
also awarded close to $200,000 in legal fees and costs. The judgment was affirmed on
appeal.2

Adkins, acting as executor of Grimley’s estate, filed a similar action concerning that
estate in the same court. That case is now stayed pending the resolution of the instant
lawsuit.
2
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II. ANALYSIS 3
A. Summary Judgment 4
1. Res Judicata
Sogliuzzo argues that, with regard to the claims related to the estate of Jane
Sogliuzzo, the District Court erred in its denial of summary judgment on res judicata
grounds. However, Sogliuzzo prevailed on these claims at trial. In its post-trial opinion,
the District Court found that “Plaintiff neither demonstrated nor supported a basis to
provide additional grounds for liability or damages in excess of [the final judgment
against Sogliuzzo in state court] regarding the Estate of Jane [Sogliuzzo].” (App. 92.)
Although Sogliuzzo’s attempt to make an argument on appeal regarding a claim on which
he prevailed at trial is puzzling, we need not reach the merits of this argument because
the denial of summary judgment is not appealable. The Supreme Court instructs that an
order denying summary judgment “retains its interlocutory character as simply a step
along the route to final judgment.” Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 184 (2011) (“Once the

3

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the district court.” S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d
248, 256 (3d Cir. 2013).
4
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case proceeds to trial, the full record developed in court supersedes the record existing at
the time of the summary-judgment motion.”). Because the claims concerning
Sogliuzzo’s liability and damages regarding Jane Sogliuzzo went to trial, the order
denying summary judgment is a nonappealable interlocutory order and not subject to
appeal.
2. Claims Against Haven Bank
Adkins asserted that Haven permitted Sogliuzzo to make withdrawals from
Grimley’s accounts and to redeem savings bonds in Grimley’s name, both to her
detriment. As a result, Adkins brought claims seeking damages against Haven for
negligence, gross negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty. The District Court found for
Haven at summary judgment, holding that Haven owed no duty to Adkins under New
Jersey common law because Haven had no special relationship with Adkins.
“The question of whether a duty exists is a matter of law to be decided by the
court.” City Check Cashing, Inc. v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 764 A.2d 411, 416 (N.J.
2001) (citations omitted). “In actions based on nonfeasance . . . ‘it is necessary to find
some definite relation between the parties, of such a character that social policy justifies
the imposition of a duty to act.’” Id. at 416-17 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser &
Keeton on Torts § 56 at 374 (5th ed. 1984)). “Absent a special relationship, courts will
typically bar claims of non-customers against banks.” Id. at 417.

7

Here, it is undisputed that Adkins was not a customer of Haven. She attempts to
establish the existence of a special relationship with Haven as a beneficiary of the
Grimley estate, but provides no authority to support this contention, nor have we located
any. Thus, Haven owed no duty to Adkins, and her common law claims must fail. 5
B. Bench Trial6
1. Claims Against Torrance
Adkins argues that the District Court made factual errors and failed to address all
claims with respect to Torrance in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued
after the bench trial. Adkins first argues that the District Court failed to address claims
against Torrance concerning Jane Sogliuzzo. However, these claims did not survive
summary judgment; thus, there was no need for the District Court to address these claims
in its post-trial opinion. Adkins also argues that the District Court made factual errors
with respect to Grimley and Jane Sogliuzzo. The District Court did misstate that the
$20,000 check from Grimley to Torrance was for her children’s tuition. While the record
Adkins’s arguments that Haven failed to follow proper procedures in redeeming
Grimley’s savings bonds are similarly unsuccessful. Adkins, a non-bondholder, does not
have a private cause of action for violation of such procedures. See Flowers v. United
States, 75 Fed. Cl. 615, 631 (2007), aff’d, 321 F. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“If a
plaintiff is not the registered owner, then the plaintiff is not in privity of contract with the
government and lacks standing to recover on the savings bonds.” (citation omitted)).
5

“When reviewing a judgment entered after a bench trial, we exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s conclusions of law and review the District Court’s findings of
fact for clear error.” CG, et al. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citing Battoni v. IBEW Local Union No. 102 Emp. Pension Plan, 594 F.3d 230, 233 (3d
Cir. 2010)).
6
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shows that Jane Sogliuzzo rather than Grimley gave Torrance a check for school tuition,
Adkins has not shown that this error impacted, or indeed was relevant to, the resolution
of the claims against Torrance at trial. 7
The remaining counts against Torrance all concern Grimley and include Aiding
the Commission of a Tort, Conspiracy to Commit Tort, and Undue Influence on Inter
Vivos Transfers. At trial, Torrance testified that the only check she received from
Grimley was one $20,000 gift, which she saw Grimley sign and which she deposited into
her bank account. The District Court determined that Torrance’s testimony was credible.
Adkins also alleged that Torrance was aware of and conspired in Sogliuzzo’s redemption
of $300,000 in U.S. Savings Bonds belonging to Grimley, but the Court determined that
“no evidence was presented to show culpability by Torrance regarding the disposition of
the bonds or their redemption.” (App. 89.)
Indeed, upon examination of the trial record, it is clear that Adkins failed to
establish the requisite “reasonable connection” between any of Torrance’s actions and the
alleged damages suffered by Grimley. See Shackil v. Lederle Labs., a Div. of Am.
Cyanamid Co., 561 A.2d 511, 514-15 (N.J. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellant also notes the District Court’s misstatement that Grimley was predeceased by
her husband and child, when apparently she was never married and had no children. This
fact is neither relevant nor material to the claims at issue here, and it need not be
addressed.
7
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With respect to conspiracy to commit a tort, Adkins similarly failed to establish “a real
agreement or confederation with a common design” with “the existence of an unlawful
purpose, or of a lawful purpose to be achieved by unlawful means.” Morganroth &
Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 406, 414 (3d Cir. 2003)
(internal citation omitted).
Finally, Adkins’s evidence at trial was insufficient to establish undue influence
over an inter vivos transfer. On appeal, Adkins merely puts together portions of
Torrance’s testimony suggesting a close and familial relationship between Torrance and
Grimley, but demonstrates neither that a confidential relationship existed, nor that
Torrance exerted undue influence over the $20,000 gift. 8 See In re Niles, 823 A.2d 1,
4-6, 10 (N.J. 2003) (defining undue influence in the trust context as “mental, moral or
physical exertion which has destroyed the free agency of a [donor] by preventing the
[donor] from following the dictates of his own mind and will and accepting instead the
domination and influence of another,” and describing a situation that meets these criteria
where an elderly woman suffering from dementia named her step-nephew as her trustee
based on an incorrect understanding of his professional position and experience, and after

8

Adkins argues that the burden was on Torrance to demonstrate that she did not exert
undue influence over Grimley concerning the $20,000 gift because of the confidential
relationship that Torrance and Grimley shared. However, the District Court found that
“Torrance was not in a confidential relationship with Grimley,” and that Adkins had “not
demonstrated that Torrance exercised undue influence for this single conveyance of
funds.” (App. 89.)
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which, her will was altered to leave hundreds of thousands of dollars to her
step-nephew’s family, and her step-nephew spent tens of thousands of dollars from her
estate on cars, jewelry and other items) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Because Adkins fails to show that the District Court erred in ruling for Torrance
on any of the claims against her, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment regarding
those claims.
2. Adverse Inference Against Sogliuzzo
Sogliuzzo appeals the District Court’s grant of Adkins’s application for an adverse
inference against him, based upon Sogliuzzo’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. “The privilege against self-incrimination may be
raised in civil as well as in criminal proceedings and applies not only at trial, but during
the discovery process as well.” SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir.
1994). However, “[u]nlike the rule in criminal cases . . . reliance on the Fifth
Amendment in civil cases may give rise to an adverse inference against the party
claiming its benefits.” Id. “Use of the privilege in a civil case may . . . carry some
disadvantages for the party who seeks its protection” because “invocation of the Fifth
Amendment poses substantial problems for an adverse party who is deprived of a source
of information that might conceivably be determinative in a search for the truth.” Id.
“The Supreme Court has cautioned that the Constitution limits ‘the imposition of
any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege costly.’” Id.
11

(quoting Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967)). However, “[t]he principle that the
invocation of the privilege may not be too ‘costly’ does not mean that it must be
‘costless.’” Id. at 191. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that “it was permissible to
draw ‘adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in
response to probative evidence offered against them.’” Id. (quoting Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976)). Ultimately, the “trial court must carefully
balance the interests of the party claiming protection against self-incrimination and the
adversary’s entitlement to equitable treatment. Because the privilege is constitutionally
based, the detriment to the party asserting it should be no more than is necessary to
prevent unfair and unnecessary prejudice to the other side.” Id. at 192.
Here, Sogliuzzo invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, and did not provide any
testimony during discovery or throughout trial regarding any of the claims at issue in this
litigation. Sogliuzzo invoked the privilege because Adkins had filed a criminal complaint
with the Hudson County prosecutor and had contacted the Secret Service regarding the
events at issue in this lawsuit. The District Court heard argument on this issue prior to
trial, and, after trial, determined that an adverse inference was proper. Although the
District Court did not clearly set out its reasoning, “[w]e may affirm the District Court on
any grounds supported by the record.” Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted). We agree that the “circumstances of [this] particular litigation” do not
create a situation in which granting an adverse inference creates a detriment that is too
12

“costly” for Sogliuzzo. Graystone Nash, 25 F.3d 187 at 191-92. Indeed, at trial, he was
“not prevented from presenting evidence to the factfinder to support his . . . position even
in the absence of [his] testimony.” Id. at 191. Thus, we affirm the District Court’s grant
of an adverse inference against Sogliuzzo.
3. Unclean Hands
Sogliuzzo argues that the District Court erred in ruling that the doctrine of unclean
hands did not prohibit Adkins from recovery. “As an equitable doctrine, application of
unclean hands rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” In re New Valley
Corp., 181 F.3d 517, 525 (3d Cir. 1999). “Only when ‘some unconscionable act of one
coming for relief has immediate and necessary relation to the equity that’ the party seeks,
will the doctrine bar recovery.” Id. (quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co.,
290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933)). Sogliuzzo asserts that Adkins willfully depleted Jane
Sogliuzzo’s estate through payments to attorneys and her husband’s consulting firm. He
also argues that testimony and evidence of checks written by Adkins, acting as executor
of the estate, to her husband’s firm soon after she became executor are sufficient to meet
the standard for unclean hands. However, the evidence Sogliuzzo presented at trial failed
to meet this standard. As the District Court noted, although it was “disturbed” by
Adkins’s spending as executor of Jane Sogliuzzo’s estate, “Sogliuzzo did not demonstrate
that Plaintiff’s conduct was willful.” In addition, Sogliuzzo did not show that Adkins

13

acted unconscionably. We will affirm the District Court’s determination that Adkins was
not barred from recovery under the doctrine of unclean hands on that ground. 9
4. Evidentiary Rulings 10
Adkins also challenges the District Court’s rulings during trial regarding the
admission of deposition transcripts and testimony.
a. Torrance’s Deposition Transcripts
Adkins asserts that the District Court abused its discretion in excluding Torrance’s
deposition testimony. The District Court permitted Torrance to testify twice at trial,
notwithstanding the fact that this is “not customarily done,” precisely because her
deposition transcripts were not going to be admitted. (Torrance Supp. App. 12-13.) The
District Court is not required to admit deposition testimony, and is certainly not required
to do so when the live witness is not only available but also testified twice during the
trial. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a). Here, the District Court was well within its
discretion in not permitting the admission of Torrance’s deposition transcripts.
b. Testimony of Adkins’s Accounting Expert
Adkins also argues that the District Court abused its discretion in not permitting
the testimony of her accounting expert, Meghan Callen, because the records on which she
“We may affirm the District Court on any grounds supported by the record.” Nicini,
212 F.3d at 805 (citation omitted).
9

“We review the District Court’s evidentiary rulings principally for abuse of discretion.”
Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
10
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would have based her testimony had not been authenticated, and the Court could neither
verify the source nor the completeness of these documents. Adkins also argues that all
parties agreed in the final pretrial order that the documents at issue were admissible. This
argument fails because each party expressly reserved the right to object at trial to the
admission of any exhibits, and there was no stipulation concerning the admissibility of
certain exhibits. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing evidence,
or testimony based upon evidence, the authenticity, source, and completeness of which
could not be verified.
c. Testimony of Charles Adkins
Adkins challenges the District Court’s trial rulings barring certain testimony from
Charles Adkins as improper expert testimony from a lay witness. Charles Adkins is the
husband of Plaintiff Jane Adkins, and his firm Adkins and Company had been retained by
Jane Adkins to provide consulting services when she became executor of Jane
Sogliuzzo’s estate. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 701, as a lay witness, Charles
Adkins was only permitted to testify to facts about which he had personal knowledge,
and the District Court prohibited him from offering expert testimony. Jane Adkins does
not dispute Charles Adkins’s status as a lay witness, and it was within the discretion of
the District Court to prohibit certain testimony concerning analysis of Sogliuzzo’s
financial records as beyond the scope of a lay witness.

15

C. Damages
The District Court found Sogliuzzo “liable for claims related to undue influence,
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, fraud, and misrepresentation,” but “defer[red] to the
probate court’s ultimate determinations regarding the appropriate calculations in the
Grimley State Court Case.” (App. 94.) Although the District Court “acknowledge[d]
that Sogliuzzo’s relationship with Grimley [met] the definition of a confidential
relationship,” and “accept[ed] that there were irregularities with the redemption of
[Grimley’s savings] bonds,” it concluded that Adkins failed “to demonstrate that these
bonds were deposited or used by Sogliuzzo.” (App. 95.) With respect to the $70,000
cash found in Grimley’s home, although noting that “the inference of mismanagement or
misuse is evident,” the Court again found that Adkins “did not demonstrate that
Sogliuzzo retained the cash for personal use or misappropriated the funds.” (App. 96.)
Ultimately, the Court found that “[t]he evidentiary support to calculate damages for this
claim was insufficient at trial,” and “defer[red] to the state probate court” to determine
damages. Id. On appeal, Adkins argues that the Court was required to find damages
after it found liability. On cross-appeal, Sogliuzzo argues that because the Court found
that Adkins’s proof was insufficient to award damages, it should have entered a judgment
of “no cause” against him.
There is no basis for the deferral that the District Court references. Where, as
here, an issue is properly before the District Court, it should decide that issue. See In re
16

Semcrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 326 (3d Cir. 2013) (“As the Supreme Court has instructed
on numerous occasions, ‘federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that
is conferred upon them by Congress.’” ) (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517
U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (collecting cases)). 11 Because the District Court found liability but
deferred to the state court’s findings with respect to damages, we reverse and remand to
the District Court to make explicit findings with respect to damages in this action. See E.
C. Ernst, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 626 F.2d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 1980) (remanding where “the
district court’s opinion ha[d] the effect of finding liability with no damages,” this Court
remanded because “the district court should, in the first instance, consider this record and
make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law on damages”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment with
respect to liability, and reverse and remand for the District Court to make a determination
with respect to damages.
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If after a hearing, the District Court concludes that insufficient evidence has been
presented to support damages, such a finding is not inconsistent with a finding of
liability. See Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass’n, 173 F. App’x 178, 180
(3d Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court’s determination not to reverse a jury verdict
finding defendants committed antitrust violations, but had not caused injury to plaintiffs).
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